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solution aimed specifically at alleviating poverty: the personal allowance mechanism 
(Leroux, 2004 and 2007). We argue that ELIE and the personal allowance mechanism, 
more than being compatible, are in fact complementary. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In his presentation of the general structure of ELIE, Kolm (2005) convincingly argues 
that the procedure is at the same time just, efficient and incentive compatible. These 
appealing properties are the three main concerns of the literature on mechanism design, but 
have rarely been achieved in combination, a frequent incompatibility of which the well-
known Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is an emblematic example in the voting context. Thus, 
Kolm’s discovery can only be commended. Yet, because Kolm’s concern is the redistribution 
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of income among the members of a vastly heterogeneous society, some rich, some poor, one 
cannot help but wonder whether ELIE can eradicate poverty in developed countries. 
 
As it turns out, ELIE performs relatively unsatisfactorily in this sense. Using French 
data, we show that the amount of redistribution—represented by the parameter k of ELIE—
necessary to eliminate poverty in France would be unreasonably large. Hence, despite the 
major appeal of the “macro” properties of ELIE, such as process freedom and Pareto 
efficiency, we deem this “micro” drawback to be an important limit of ELIE. We propose to 
augment ELIE with mechanism aimed specifically at alleviating poverty: the personal 
allowance mechanism. We argue that the personal allowance mechanism is very much in line 
with the driving principles motivating ELIE. Moreover, from a practical viewpoint, we build 
on previous studies (Leroux 2004, 2007) to suggest that redirecting a small fraction of the 
income collected with ELIE (the equivalent of a bit more than one hour per week) toward the 
personal allocation mechanism would be enough to eliminate poverty altogether. 
 
Naturally, our claim regarding the limit of ELIE we identified here and the potential 
gains achievable by incorporating the personal allowance should not be interpreted as a 
criticism of ELIE or, if so, merely as a constructive one. In fact, Kolm himself suggests in 
this volume (p. ??) that ELIE must be amended with other, “micro” mechanisms:  
 
“ELIE takes care of the distribution function of public finance for “macrojustice,” that is the 
overall distribution of the value of the main resources according to general rules. Other 
policies, social insurance, or charities, take care of issues of “microjustice” specific in terms of 
occasion, need, good, or people aided.” 
 
 
II LIMITS OF ELIE 
 
This section aims at illustrating this fact by examining the limits of ELIE using 
French data. Before doing so, we first consider a very simplified example, using a linear 
income distribution, in order to describe the inner workings of ELIE with respect to the issue 
of alleviating poverty. 
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1) A simplified example: linear income distribution 
 
We consider here a simplified situation in which the income distribution is linear in 
the population-income space. In other words, the top income of the dth decile is equal to d 
times the top income of the first decile of population. Such an income distribution is far from 
being realistic but exhibits neat graphical properties which we shall exploit to illustrate the 
consequences of ELIE with respect to poverty relief. See Figure 1. 
 
 
We denote by ymean and ymed the mean income and median income of the population, 
respectively. While ymed is typically smaller than ymean in practice, the two values coincide in 
this simplified example. The value of ymed plays no role in the determination of the income 
transfers associated with ELIE but is instrumental in defining the poverty line in the case of 
France, which will be the country of interest in the next sections. Specifically, in France, any 
person whose income is less than half the median income is officially considered poor.1 Thus, 
                                                
1 Note that in other countries, such as in the US, the poverty line is not determined relative to the income 
distribution within the nation but relative to the income needed to purchase a minimal bundle of goods deemed 
necessary for a decent standard of living. The choice of a poverty line is beyond the scope of this text and we 
shall simply take as given the criterion used in France. 
Population 
(deciles) 
Income (y) 
1st    2nd    3rd    4th   5th  6th 7th    8th     9th    10th 
p 
post-ELIE 
distribution 
ymean = ymed 
poverty line (= 0.5 ymed) 
k*ymean 
pre-ELIE 
distribution 
Figure 1 
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the aim of this exercise is to describe the evolution of the proportion of the population falling 
below the poverty line as the redistribution parameter, k, varies. Recall that “With ELIE, th[e] 
degree [of redistribution] depends only on coefficient k, … ” (Kolm, this volume) 
Strictly speaking, this redistribution parameter, k, is interpreted by Kolm (2005) as a 
duration of labor, which can be adjusted to take into account other dimension of the labor 
task considered such as effort, risk involvement, tediousness, etc. However, there is also a 
sense in which k can be interpreted as a proportional income tax. Indeed, if we assume in a 
rough approximation that the large majority of the population works full time, so that income 
is a good proxy for wage, collecting the fruit of a given duration of labor (as in ELIE) 
amounts to collecting the corresponding percentage of income (as a proportional income tax 
would). Note, however, that this rough “equivalence” only holds quantitatively but not, for 
instance, in terms of the disincentives usually associated with a proportional income tax. 
It follows from the above approximation that the net income transfer awarded to 
individual i amounts to k(ymean-yi). Clearly, this transfer is positive for one whose income is 
below the mean income level and negative for one whose income is above, as demanded by 
ELIE. Graphically, it follows that the post-transfer distribution is also a line, which is 
obtained by rotating the original line clockwise around ymean (and, de facto, around ymed) 
Moreover, because ymed is not affected by the transfers stipulated by ELIE, neither is the 
poverty line. Hence, ELIE necessarily reduces the size of the poor population, p. In fact, 
poverty is eliminated for any value of k greater than 0.5, which amounts to the equivalent of 
2.5 days of labor per week. This value is quite large compared to current income tax rates, 
even for France. But, the pre-transfer income distribution being arbitrary, this result is not 
grounded in any reality and there is no need for alarm (yet). 
 
 
2) ELIE in France 
 
We are now ready to consider the case of real data, by applying the same reasoning to 
the income distribution of France, and provide answers the following question: Can ELIE 
eliminate poverty? Clearly, it can, as a value of k=1 results in the egalitarian allocation of 
income. Nevertheless, as Kolm argues, such an extreme value of k is untenable on grounds of 
social stability (unanimity would massively be violated) and incentive compatibility (why 
should I work at all if my final income is independent of my effort?). Hence, a more 
interesting question is: Can ELIE eliminate poverty for reasonable values of k? 
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We argue that the value of k necessary to relieve France of poverty is unreasonably 
large. In this section, we first determine this value of the redistribution parameter and then 
discuss the practical consequences of implementing such a value. 
 
The current income distribution of France is depicted in Table 1, which contains 
information on primary incomes (i.e. before tax and prior to any redistributive transfers) by 
decile. The contents of Table 1 were inferred from INSEE data on total income and on 
financial aid (see Appendix). 
 
Table 1: Primary income in euros by decile (Year 1999) 
Decile Top income in decile Mean income in decile 
1st 4,660 2,453 
2nd 8,828 7,417 
3rd 12,210 10,912 
4th 15,738 14,295 
5th 19,476 17,807 
6th 23,667 21,676 
7th 28,568 26,178 
8th 35,149 31,774 
9th 46,082 40,061 
10th - 69,510 
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Figure 2: Primary income distribution in France 
 
Unlike the linear distribution previously considered, this distribution is almost linear for the 
lower half of the distribution, with a slight concavity for very low incomes, and a sharper 
convexity at high incomes (see Figure 2). However, one should note that the current income 
distribution of France is necessarily a consequence of the various policies in effect in France, 
including minimum wage policies. Because ELIE itself takes care of such issues as minimum 
wage, it is not meant to be implemented on top of current minimum wage policies, but 
instead of them. Therefore, before applying ELIE, we must first make an effort to recover 
what the income distribution would have been were these policies not in effect. Because such 
counterfactual information is—of course—unavailable, we opted for correcting the current 
distribution in the following simple but conservative fashion. 
 
First of all, we should consider that current minimum wage policies only affect the 
lowest portion of the income distribution. In other words, we take the view that the convex 
shape obtained for high incomes in the actual data accurately reflects the shape of the 
counterfactual distribution. Moreover, one may expect this counterfactual distribution to be 
convex for low incomes as well, instead of the concave shape we actually observe. Thus, for 
simplicity, we shall correct for the effect of minimum wage policies by adopting a linear 
distribution in the low-income range (i.e., up to the medium earner, see Figure 3). This 
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rectification, literally, is a conservative one and will actually underestimate the value of k 
necessary to eliminate poverty, as we shall discuss later. 
 
Figure 3: Adjusted income distribution 
 
We are now ready to evaluate the performance of ELIE concerning the alleviation of poverty. 
Values of interest after redistribution, such as the minimum and median income level, the 
poverty line and the proportion of the population falling below it can all be expressed in 
terms of k and the (pre-transfer) values of ymean and ymed. Specifically, the post-transfer 
minimum income level equals k * ymean, which is an immediate consequence of the lump-sum 
feature of the redistribution of ELIE. Similarly, the post-ELIE median income level: 
 
ymed’ = ymed + k(ymean-ymed). 
 
Also, recall that in France the poverty level is tied to the median income and its post-transfer 
value is therefore equal to 0.5 ymed’. Finally, our linear approximation of the lower half of the 
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income distribution allows us to compute the proportion of the population falling below the 
poverty level: 
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Numerically, with values of ymed = €19,476 and ymean = €24,208 from the data, we obtain that 
eliminating poverty (so that the minimum income level becomes greater than equal to the 
poverty level) would require a value for k of at least 0.446. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ELIE income distribution in France 
  
It is interesting to compare this value (of 44.6%) with the 43.6% at which French citizens are 
currently taxed on average (including direct and indirect taxes, as well as social 
contributions). Moreover, as the current socio-economic context suggests, it may be difficult 
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to convince French citizens to pay more taxes than they already do. Hence, one can expect 
the implementation of ELIE to face strong resistance from the citizens of France. Not only 
that, but devoting 44.6% of the income of the citizens solely to redistribution would imply 
that an additional 10% or 12% would be needed to maintain some form of government 
(national defense, police, judicial system, etc.). Considering that 43.6% of income currently 
finances almost entirely education and health care, we argue that eliminating poverty in 
France via ELIE would be a difficult pill to swallow for the French population. 
 
How much poverty can ELIE reasonably eliminate in France? Considering that roughly 10% 
of GDP is necessary to ensure the maintenance of a minimal government structure, and 
taking current average tax rate as given at 43.6% (thus corresponding to a value for k ≈ 33%, 
after financing of a minimal government), ELIE would reduce poverty to roughly p’ =9.7% 
of the population (down from p = 19% if no redistribution were carried out). Once again, it is 
worthwhile comparing this value to the current size of the poor population, which is of 7%. In 
other words, ELIE is less effective than the current redistributive system (even without the 
burden of financing education and health care, thus making the poor effectively even 
poorer!). Our conclusion is that ELIE cannot satisfactorily eliminate poverty under its current 
form, but must be modified in order to do so. We devote the remainder of the text to 
providing specific suggestions towards improving the performance of ELIE. 
 
 
III THE PERSONAL ALLOWANCE MECHANISM 
 
The sole purpose of the personal allowance mechanism is to redistribute wealth so as to 
alleviate poverty. As such, its goal is to channel wealth from the well-to-do to the needy, 
which appears to be at odds with a procedure like ELIE which awards every citizen the same 
lump sum. And, while the collection process does differentiate between individuals, thus 
leading to the needy becoming “net-receivers” and the well-to-do becoming “net-givers”, this 
fixed lump sum is not sufficient to pull the needy above the poverty line, as we illustrate in 
the previous section for the case of France. Moreover, as Figures 1 and 3 indicate, those 
which are pulled out of poverty are the ones closer to the poverty line. While this feature 
makes good sense on efficiency grounds, it leaves an entire population of individuals which 
are hopelessly doomed to remain below the poverty line. In the absence of a better 
mechanism, the performance of ELIE regarding the issue of poverty could be deemed 
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acceptable (if poverty were ever an acceptable circumstance). However, it turns out that such 
a mechanism does exist: the personal allowance (or PERAL) mechanism. Preliminary studies 
show that the personal allowance mechanism could alleviate poverty entirely at the much 
cheaper fare of 3% of GDP (in the case of France2) compared to 44.6% of GDP 
(corresponding to the value of k = 0.446). This section is devoted to describing the personal 
allowance mechanism as well as making explicit its relationship with ELIE. Far from being at 
odds with one another, we find that both mechanisms are likely to be complementary, with 
ELIE governing the general redistribution of wealth while the PERAL mechanism fine-tunes 
the new distribution so as to alleviate poverty. 
 
 
1) The mechanism 
 
The mechanism takes place in two steps. First, the government collects a portion of the 
citizens’ income and redistributes the generated revenue equally among all citizens (just as 
ELIE would) in the form of vouchers. We call this lump sum their base allowance. So far, the 
PERAL mechanism is entirely compatible with ELIE, if not identical to it. Indeed, the 
PERAL mechanism does not specify the collection method, which could very well be 
conducted as in ELIE, with its own value of the redistribution parameter, l, taken to be the 
analog of Kolm’s k, though much smaller in size.3 
The second step concerns the final redistribution of the citizens’ base allowance, which is 
done via a new type of entity, which we call redistributive mutual companies. These mutual 
companies are groups to which citizens voluntarily join and deposit their base allowances 
(vouchers). These mutual companies then reallocate the corresponding revenue between its 
members, with the objective of targeting the needy. Before discussing the relationship 
between ELIE and the PERAL mechanism, and given the novelty of the redistributive mutual 
companies, we devote the next section to describing their functioning in some detail. 
 
2) Redistributive mutual companies 
 
                                                
2 See Leroux (2004). 
3 A value of l=0,03 corresponds to 3% of GDP, which is all that would be necessary to alleviate poverty in the 
case of France. 
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As the name suggests, the purpose of redistributive mutual companies is to redistribute 
wealth. Also, as described in the previous section, the total amount of wealth to be 
redistributed consists of the sum total of its members’ base allowances. What is less clear, at 
this point, is the composition of these mutual companies, which is what we shall now specify, 
along with precise rules as to their function. 
First of all, a specific rule governs the eligibility of individuals to adhere to given 
mutual companies: all members of a given mutual company must have at least one observable 
characteristic in common. In fact, this common characteristic de facto defines the mutual 
company, and becomes its label. This characteristic could be tied to geographical status (e.g., 
people born in a given region) or to a hobby (e.g., people whom take part in a given sport), 
but many others possibilities can arise naturally as more and more people relate to given 
characteristics. Indeed, because redistributive mutual companies will result from the personal 
initiative of citizens, and are not imposed by the governing authority, their defining labels 
will reflect the people’s sense of identity. The reason for placing this condition on eligibility 
is to foster sympathy and, in turn, voluntary redistribution between the members of the 
mutual companies. By joining a mutual company which is built around a characteristic with 
which they identify, people are likely to feel sympathetic towards their fellow members, 
simply because they can relate to them via their common characteristic. As a result, helping 
out a fellow member in distress becomes easier. 
The phenomenon of increased generosity is likely to arise even if many members of 
the same mutual company may never meet.4 Indeed, redistributive mutual companies may 
become quite large. In addition, they should be required by law to be of a minimum size, say 
of a few thousand members, so as to avoid clannish behavior. Without such a lower bound on 
size, the common characteristic which defines a given mutual company may be so specific as 
to intentionally exclude the vast majority of the population. On the contrary, the purpose of 
mutual companies is to include every citizen in the PERAL mechanism, and to ensure that 
everyone will be able to choose between several mutual companies. Moreover, certain 
characteristics may not be allowed to be the defining characteristic of mutual companies. It 
will be the governing institution’s role to forbid mutual companies based around criminal 
                                                
4 Increased generosity can be seen as the result of two reinforcing effects. A direct effect, due to proximity to the 
net receiver, via the common characteristic, makes givers derive greater satisfaction from knowing that their 
contribution will be targeted towards someone with whom they feel a certain affinity.  But an indirect effect, 
albeit a slight one, accentuates this increase in generosity. Indeed, because net receivers are benefiting from 
contributions from their fellow members, they are likely to be more parsimonious in their demands. As a result, 
and knowing that the net receivers will likely be more considerate than if they were supported by an anonymous 
government, givers will have a greater desire to help their fellow members. 
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activity or indecent behavior. Likewise, mutual companies defined by political, religious or 
ethnic backgrounds may be deemed as inappropriate. 
In addition to the above-mentioned instances, the governing institution may also 
intervene to ensure that each redistributive mutual company abides by the regulations in 
place. In particular, their accounting will be subject to scrutiny as well as their procedure to 
reallocate the funds among its members. The PERAL mechanism being one of assistance to 
the needy, with the elimination of poverty as its ultimate goal, any subversive reallocation of 
funds (e.g., nepotism, lotteries, etc.) will be forbidden. However, aside from guaranteeing that 
funds will be used towards alleviating poverty, the governing institution will not be allowed 
to interfere in the actual method of redistribution within mutual companies. 
Redistribution within mutual companies is decided upon collectively via the 
democratic election. In addition, each mutual company is free to implement as little or as 
much redistribution as decided upon by the board. Naturally, people in need will choose to 
avoid companies which decide to not operate any redistribution whatsoever—thus 
“refunding” each member their base allowance, minus a possible tax incentive—in favor of 
those which redistribute more. Such behavior is understandable, as people in need are likely 
to value financial aid more than group identity, and vote with their feet accordingly. Freedom 
to choose one’s mutual company, and to switch away from it as its mode redistribution ceases 
to meet one’s expectations, is essential to achieving an equilibrium state where the needy 
receive sufficient financial support.  
Now that the composition and the internal structure of redistributive mutual 
companies have been clarified, we turn to perhaps the most important interrogations. Will it 
be enough to alleviate poverty? At what price? 
 
3) Redistribution 
 
It is quite natural to be skeptical regarding the performance or the PERAL mechanism. 
Unlike existing financial assistance programs, which allocate resources to the needy 
according to a predetermined schedule on observable life circumstances (number of children, 
employment status, income level, etc.), the PERAL mechanism relies entirely on the—
optional—sympathy that citizens may feel towards one another. Therefore, concerns as to 
whether enough redistribution will be carried out so as to eradicate poverty are legitimate. 
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Indeed, should every mutual company choose to refund all members their base allowance, 
there would be little hope.5 
 In preliminary studies, Leroux (2004, 2007) shows evidence that more than sufficient 
redistribution should take place to eliminate poverty under the PERAL mechanism in the case 
of France. The study relies on interview data which, despite the care taken in designing the 
survey and the sample, is not exempt of shortcomings. Nonetheless, even pessimistic 
corrections of the data lead to the conclusion that people would be generous enough to 
channel more than enough wealth towards the needy. In comparison to the existing aid 
programs in France, Leroux (2004, 2007) finds that the PERAL mechanism is likely to 
perform better (i.e., to eradicate poverty entirely, whereas the current programs still leave 4 
million people below the poverty line, including 1 million children) with less funds 
(amounting to a base allowance of less than 73 Euros per month). The study assumes a fiscal 
incentive of 50%, meaning that 50 cents of every Euro of base allowance not devoted to 
redistribution are collected by the governing authority as tax revenue, which is then 
reinvested in the mechanism.6 
 Knowing that the extent to which sympathy towards people in need translates 
into actual wealth being transferred is extremely encouraging. However, one must also make 
sure that this burst of generosity is efficiently allocated. Two major concerns arise. The first 
one relates to the PERAL mechanism itself, and to the possible imbalance in the formation of 
the redistributive mutual companies. For instance, one may be concerned that mutual 
companies form around characteristics which are highly correlated with income. In other 
words, the concern that there may be too many “rich companies” and “poor companies”, both 
reluctant to redistribute wealth, either by choice (the former) or by necessity (the latter). As a 
solution against such possible undesirable structure of mutual companies, the governing 
authority will be able to establish public mutual companies, whose financing is augmented 
via the tax revenue from the fiscal incentive to redistribute (at a rate of 50% in the study 
described above). The sole purpose of the public mutual companies is to redistribute this tax 
revenue among the poor who were unable to find a mutual company capable of rescuing them 
satisfactorily.  
                                                
5 Nonetheless, the presence of a fiscal incentive to redistribute should generate some revenue, which can then be 
devoted to aiding the needy.   
6 It should be noted that such taxation would be in addition to—and independent of—the lump-sum collection 
carried out in Step 1 (and governed by the parameter k). Nonetheless, a study in Leroux (2004) evaluates at 
0.4% of GDP the size of the tax revenue necessary to induce sufficient participation to eradicate poverty in 
France, which is of the order of k/100. We thank Claude Gamel for this observation. 
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Finally, another major concern relates to the redistribution of wealth within mutual 
companies, which we now describe. Unlike current government programs, which award 
financial assistance based on objective characteristics, so how can one make sure that aid will 
adequately target the needy as intended by the program? Indeed, recipients of financial aid in 
the PERAL mechanism are to be determined via face-to-face dialogue between potential 
recipients and representatives of the mutual companies who are in charge of evaluating the 
needs of the claimants.  These representatives should also be members of the mutual 
company, whom choose to carry out their duty voluntarily, truthfully and impartially. At first 
glance, such a glowing description seems to apply only to a select few, rendering the 
mechanism seemingly inoperable and in danger of being crippled by corruption. Yet, many 
individuals exist whom fit the description accurately. They are among us, and most of them 
are not high-profile individuals, but simply people who wish take part in the well-being of 
their community and who are not after glory, money or any tangible advantages. Indeed, the 
qualities we envision for representatives of mutual companies are similar to those possessed 
by the municipal counselors of our local governments today.  
Finally, talk of the private management of public funds often raises eyebrows. This 
legitimate the concern stems from the very strength of the mechanism: if mutual companies 
are able to decide who will be the beneficiaries of the mechanism, how can abuse be 
prevented? It is expected that unscrupulous individuals would attempt to exaggerate their 
needs in order to take advantage of the fact that wealth is not be distributed according to 
objective and observable characteristics, but through dialogue. In addition to government 
audits from the Internal Revenue Service which will discourage obviously unreasonable 
reallocations, it would be up to the representatives to distinguish between legitimate claims 
and exaggerated ones. Because representatives would only be net givers, they would have 
little interest in manipulating the redistribution process. Finally, rotation schedules whereby 
no representative is assigned to the same claimant for a long period of time should discourage 
collusion with the recipients of aid. 
To sum up, the fact that resources are redistributed according to criteria decided upon 
within the mutual companies is actually the major strength of the personal allowance 
mechanism. Because members of a mutual company share at least one common characteristic 
of their choice and, in all likelihood, a characteristic which is most meaningful to them, they 
are likely to feel closer to each other than to the rest of the population. Hence, they will be 
more prone to redistributing wealth among themselves (as opposed to the anonymous 
government or, worse, to some presumed mooch who decides to take advantage of the 
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system). Moreover, members whom end up being net receivers will be less likely to 
exaggerate their needs, knowing that the burden will fall on their fellow members (once 
again, as opposed to the anonymous government or to a mass of strangers towards whom they 
feel no affinity whatsoever). By emphasizing closeness (of tastes, of geographical location, or 
otherwise), the personal allowance mechanism reinforces the individuals’ proclivity towards 
solidarity or, more specifically, towards mutual aid7. Moreover, as is intended, this “mutual 
aid via closeness” argument—increased generosity in giving combined with more restraint in 
asking—would still hold even when the size of these mutual companies reaches thousands of 
members. 
 
 
IV ELIE and the PERAL mechanism 
 
The PERAL mechanism described in the previous section has no other goal than to 
eliminate poverty in rich countries. In other words, it is not aimed at solving issues of 
redistribution beyond that of poverty. Hence, the PERAL mechanism is a “micro” 
mechanism, grounded on fairness considerations at the microeconomic level, whereas ELIE 
is a “macro” mechanism, aimed at respecting macrojustice (Kolm 2005). Therefore, these 
two mechanisms are not competing with one another. In fact, we show here that they are 
complementary, both in the normative sense and in terms of implementation. 
 
Naturally, the first step of the PERAL mechanism in our description (i.e., its 
financing) can be seen as a direct offshoot of the ELIE mechanism. Hence, it will suffice to 
show that the second step of the PERAL mechanism (redistribution) is in line with ELIE’s 
intrinsic properties of process freedom and Pareto efficiency. 
 
The PERAL mechanism clearly respects process freedom, as all citizens are free to 
take her base allowance to the mutual company of her choice (and switch at any time), be it 
by intrinsic affinity or because the redistributive policy suits them best. Moreover, within a 
mutual company, they are free to vote for whatever redistributive policy they choose to 
support and define the company’s guidelines for redistribution. 
 
                                                
7 See Leroux and Leroux (2008) for a formal distinction between the concepts of solidarity and mutual aid. 
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Lastly, we check that Pareto efficiency is satisfied by establishing that the 
redistributive structure of the PERAL mechanism would not give rise to perverse 
disincentives. In other words, one must ensure that no individual (or only a small minority) 
will decide to work less in anticipation of receiving a larger personal allowance (recall that 
the “collection” portion of the mechanism is already taken care of, thanks to Kolm’s 
profound analysis of ELIE).  Because transfers are made within mutual companies, and 
because the members of a given company are somewhat close, our “mutual aid via closeness” 
argument above applies, and we can expect such manipulative behavior to be kept to a 
minimum. 
 
Hence, the personal allowance mechanism is entirely in line with the driving 
principles of ELIE. Moreover, one can expect this mechanism to solve the issue of poverty 
elimination using only a fraction of the income collected with ELIE. Indeed, collecting 3% of 
GDP corresponds to an equalizing labor, k, of barely more than one hour per week.  
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
We illustrated, using the example of France, that ELIE did not perform satisfactorily 
regarding the issue of poverty elimination. Despite its major appeals as far as macrojustice is 
concerned, we showed that the redistributive parameter, k, had to be unreasonably large in 
order to eliminate poverty. Moreover, for values comparable to the current average tax rate, 
we saw that ELIE performed much worse than existing aid programs. 
To correct for this “micro” (but important) drawback, we suggested amending ELIE 
with another mechanism which is aimed specifically at eliminating poverty while retaining 
the driving principles of freedom and Pareto efficiency: the personal allowance mechanism. 
Backed by previous studies, we argued that the personal allowance mechanism can eliminate 
poverty using only a small fraction of the income collected by ELIE (the equivalent of a bit 
more than one hour per week). We argue that ELIE and the personal allowance mechanism, 
more than being compatible, are in fact complementary. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2 : Mean yearly French household income (excluding capital income), in deciles, in euros, and 
portion of total income 
 Top income in decile Mean income in decile % of total income 
1st decile 7,304 3,845 1 
2nd decile 11,091 9,318 4 
3rd decile 14,099 12,601 5 
4th decile 17,219 15,640 6 
5th decile 20,631 18,863 7 
6th decile 24,653 22,579 9 
7th decile 29,361 26,904 11 
8th decile 35,757 32,324 13 
9th decile 46,642 40,548 16 
10th decile  69,930 28 
(Source: « INSEE, revenus fiscaux 1999, hors revenus du patrimoine ») 
 
 
Table 3: Proportion of financial aid in gross income by decile, in %. 
 
  Decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
« Alloc, familiales » 6.6 4.4 3.1 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.4 
« Autres prest, familiales » 5.3 4.1 3.2 2.3 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 
« Alloc, logement » 12.9 7.6 4.4 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 
« Minima sociaux » 11.4 4.3 2.7 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
  
  
Source: « Enquête revenus fiscaux 2000, INSEE-DGI » 
 
